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Are Cognitive Functions Localizable?
The Fall 2011 issue of this journal published a 
two-paper section on “Neuroeconomics.” One 
paper, by Ernst Fehr and Antonio Rangel, clearly 
and concisely summarized a small part of the fast-
growing literature. The second paper, “It’s about 
Space, It’s about Time, Neuroeconomics, and the 
Brain Sublime,” by Marieke van Rooij and Guy Van 
Orden, is beautifully written and enjoyable to read, 
but misleading in many critical ways. A number 
of economists and neuroscientists working at the 
intersection of the two fi elds shared our reaction 
and have signed this letter, as shown below. Some of 
the paper’s descriptions of empirical fi ndings and 
methods in neuroeconomics are incomplete, badly 
out of date, or fl atly wrong. In studies the authors 
describe in detail, their skeptical interpretations 
have often been refuted by published data, old and 
new, that they overlook.
In the fi rst part of their paper, van Rooij and 
Van Orden argue that neuroimaging studies are 
based on a faulty model of how the brain works 
because brain functions cannot be spatially local-
ized to particular brain regions or networks. 
Skepticism about spatial localization is not new. 
Fifteen years ago, Van Orden and Paap (1997) also 
attacked the strong spatial modularity view. But 
15 years is a long time ago in neuroscience. Skepti-
cism about spatially locating brain circuitry might 
have been cautiously reasonable in 1997, but is 
clearly a minority view in neuroscience now. During 
those intervening years, the focus on localization of 
multiple regions (“circuits”) has actually proved to 
be very useful. For example, in their textbook Neu-
roscience, Purves et al. (2008, p. 22) note:
When used in combination with functional 
imaging, well-designed behavioral tasks can 
facilitate identifi cation of brain networks 
devoted to specifi c complex functions, includ-
ing language skills, mathematical and musical 
ability, emotional responses, aesthetic judg-
ments, and abstract thinking.
In addition, there are many examples of fairly 
localized functional specialization. Examples include 
language areas and pathways, somatosensory cortex 
(for example, perception of touch), face recog-
nition, and visual areas clearly corresponding to 
distinct steps in visual processing. For higher-order 
cognition, it is certainly true that a single region of 
the brain identifi ed by one study is likely to be active 
in a variety of tasks. However, van Rooij and Van 
Orden substantially overrepresent the case against 
functional localization in their Appendix by only list-
ing a highly selective set of studies with the widest 
range of different interpretations.
Van Rooij and Van Orden did not describe the 
many methods that are actively used now to check 
whether localized spatial regions predict com-
mon functional activity across tasks. For example, 
cross-method studies combine fMRI, causal manip-
ulation of activity in targeted regions of the brain 
(using transcranial stimulation with magnetism or 
direct current), and behavior of patients with focal 
lesion damage in certain regions. Results from 
these types of studies will simply not fi t together 
if there is no functionally reliable localization. 
Another tool is “activation likelihood estimation,” 
a meta-analytic method of combining results from 
many different studies. Regions that appear in tasks 
with a common functional component repeat-
edly are picked out by this approach, and regions 
with study-specifi c activity disappear. This method 
has been used since Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, and 
Zeffi ro (2002); the latest version is described in 
Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird, Kurth, and Fox (2012). 
Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, and Wager 
(2011) offer other methods of computational meta-
analysis of neuroimaging data.
Van Rooij and Van Orden offer two specifi c exam-
ples in this part of their discussion: neuroimaging 
studies of ultimatum bargaining and trust games, 
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and of the ambiguity-risk distinction. Both discus-
sions are misleading.
Sanfey et al. (2003) fi rst used fMRI during ulti-
matum bargaining. Van Rooij and Van Orden 
note that:
If we take the results concerning fairness and 
generosity from the trust game, together with 
the previous results concerning unfairness and 
punishment from the ultimatum game, it would 
appear that responses to fairness and unfairness 
are formulated in different parts of the brain.
However, recent studies corroborate many of the 
conclusions of Sanfey et al. (2003) quite well. For 
instance, Chang, Smith, Dufwenberg, and Sanfey 
(2011) fi nd substantial overlap between the neural 
systems involved in decision-making in the trust 
game and the regions identifi ed by Sanfey et al. in 
the ultimatum game. Furthermore, if Sanfey et al. 
(2003) had wrongly interpreted the roles of the 
brain regions identifi ed in their study, then disrupt-
ing activity in those brain regions using trans cranial 
magnetic stimulation should have no effect on 
responder behavior in ultimatum games. But it 
does, as Fehr and Rangel point out (citing Knoch, 
Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, and Fehr 2006).
In their example of the neural distinction 
between responses to risky and ambiguous gambles, 
van Rooij and Van Orden compare results from 
Smith, Dickhaut, McCabe, and Pardo (2002) and 
Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, and Camerer (2005). 
But these papers are not comparable, because the 
tasks are quite distinct. Smith et al. use variants of 
Ellsberg colored-ball tasks, choosing between an 
ambiguous gamble and a risky gamble (in some 
trials). Hsu et al. had subjects choose between cer-
tain amounts or individual gambles. Thus, Smith’s 
contrasts do not directly measure the difference 
between computation of ambiguous gamble valu-
ation compared to risky gamble valuation; Hsu 
et al.’s analyses do measure that difference (using a 
conjunction of activity in all three tasks).
Moreover, the Hsu et al. (2005) fi nding of stron-
ger lateral activity in the orbitofrontal cortex in 
response to ambiguity has been corroborated 
in two ways. In their original paper, they predict 
that people with brain damage in that area of the 
brain would be ambiguity-neutral, and they test and 
confi rm this hypothesis in their paper. In addition, 
their fi ndings were closely corroborated by Levy, 
Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, and Glimcher (2010, 
fi g. S5). Van Rooij and Van Orden do not mention 
either of these corroborations.
In addition to their limited discussion of the neu-
roeconomic literature, van Rooij and Van Orden 
misrepresent the statistical methodology of neuro-
imaging. For example, they write that “the spatial 
approach to studying the brain assumes that the 
brain can be treated as the sum of its parts . . . this 
approach underlies what is often called the General 
Linear Model of the brain.” There is no so-called 
“General Linear Model of the Brain.” The phrase 
“General Linear Model” in the context of neuro-
imaging refers simply to the statistical technique 
of multiple linear regression. The term General 
Linear Model is never used by neuroscientists to 
describe a model of how the whole brain works; for 
example, the term does not appear in any widely 
used neuroimaging textbook.
Another misrepresentation involves the discus-
sion of multiple tests of statistical hypotheses. 
Van Rooij and Van Orden say “any contrast using 
brain images can be counted on to make ‘discover-
ies’.” Neuroimaging researchers are well aware of 
the potential for false positives. Every widely used 
neuro imaging textbook contains detailed discus-
sions of the multiple comparisons problem and 
methods for addressing it (for example, Ashby, 
2011, chap. 6; Poldrack, Mumford, and Nichols, 
2011, chap. 7; Huettel, Song, and McCarthy, 2009, 
chap. 12). The best standard of practice in neuro-
imaging research is to describe and account for 
the multiple testing problem (Poldrack, Fletcher, 
Henson, Worsley, Brett, and Nichols 2008).
To summarize what you have just read: the criti-
cism that spatial identifi cation of brain regions and 
circuits cannot be identifi ed with functions is an old 
criticism. It has largely been disproven, is no longer 
widely believed in neuroscience, can be tested with 
various methods (cross-method and meta-analysis), 
is largely disproven for one example they discuss 
(ultimatums) by newer studies, and is disproven for 
the other example (ambiguity) by data in the same 
paper they cite.
More broadly, the description of the general meth-
odology of neuroeconomic research by van Rooij 
and Van Orden is misleading. Even given that 
articles in this journal are not meant to be compre-
hensive literature reviews, their sourcing on general 
neuroeconomics is surprisingly thin, ignoring the 
leading edited compilation (Glimcher, Camerer, 
Fehr, and Poldrack 2009), several reviews (for exam-
ple, Fehr and Camerer 2007; Loewenstein, Rick, 
and Cohen 2008), recent papers from inside eco-
nomics (such as Bernheim 2009; Rustichini 2009), 
and a thoughtful recent book (Glimcher, 2011). In 
their online Appendix, they strangely, but clearly, 
misplotted many brain areas.
The more interesting part of the van Rooij 
and Van Orden paper, which is closely linked to 
Van Orden’s own research, is about why attention 
to the detailed time course of neural activity is 
important (as a supplement to spatial understand-
ing). There is no disagreement here, since virtually 
all neuro scientists who use methods with good time 
resolution do so to understand fi ne-grained (sub-
second) temporal dynamics, neuroeconomists 
included. Indeed, the Fehr and Rangel paper in the 
same issue of this journal discusses drift diffusion 
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models, which predict choices, response times, and 
other temporal features.
For more than 10 years neuroeconomists have 
thought about the criticisms and methodological 
imperfections described by Van Orden and Papp 
(1997) and have fi gured out how to respond to 
those criticisms. It is unfortunate that the paper 
by van Rooij and Van Orden does not refl ect this 
progress, and therefore misleads readers about the 
state-of-the-art, rather than educating them.
Colin Camerer, Caltech
Alec Smith, Caltech
Signers (ordered by timing of reply):
Camelia M. Kuhnen, Northwestern
Donald T. Wargo, Temple
Gregory Samanez-Larkin, Vanderbilt
Read Montague, Virginia Tech
Dino J. Levy, NYU
David Smith, Duke
Dar Meshi, Freie Universitaet Berlin
Peter H. Kenning, Zeppelin University, Germany
John Clithero, Caltech
Bernd Weber, Bonn
Todd Hare, Zurich
Scott Huettel, Duke
Camilla Josephson, Linköping University
Mathieu d’Acremont, Caltech
Daria Knoch, Basel
Ian Krajbich, Zurich
Benedetto De Martino, University College London
Peter N. C. Mohr, Freie Universität Berlin
Jan Barton, Emory
Marja-Liisa Halko, Aalto University
Christina F. Chick, Cornell University
Lorena Gianotti, Basel
Hauke R. Heekeren, Freie Universität Berlin
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Response from Marieke van Rooij and 
John G. Holden*
Van Rooij and Van Orden outlined several practi-
cal and theoretical concerns about research efforts 
that link specifi c spatial locations in the brain to 
specifi c economic, emotional, and cognitive struc-
tures, in the Fall 2011 issue (“It’s About Space, It’s 
About Time, Neuroeconomics and the Brain Sub-
lime,” pp. 31–56). They offered an alternative view 
focused on the brain and body’s temporal dimen-
sion. The alternative proposal is that thought and 
behavior are supported by fl exible, self-organizing, 
and dynamic pattern formation processes 
(Van Orden, Holden, and Turvey 2003, 2005). In 
their letter, Camerer, Smith, and their co-signers 
question the validity of this critique. Our response 
is directed at their essential claim that our skepti-
cism regarding spatial modularity of brain function 
has been superseded and even largely disproven.
Attempts to relate spatial brain coordinates to 
high-level cognitive functions are motivated by a 
subtractive logic. More active brain regions require 
more nutrients such as oxygen and glucose than 
less active regions. Brain imaging methods mea-
sure various markers that accompany the resulting 
metabolic changes in blood fl ow, either directly or 
indirectly. For example, fMRI measures the BOLD 
signal, the ratio of oxyhemoglobin (Hb) to deoxy-
hemoglobin (dHb) in the cerebral blood fl ow. 
Typically, for each volume element (voxel) of the 
brain, the relative metabolic activity corresponds to 
one pixel in a corresponding neuroimage. Thus, 
increased brain activation accompanied by larger 
BOLD signals in an fMRI scan, map to increased 
intensity levels in a neuroimage. The location of 
cognitive function is identifi ed with differences in 
normalized and averaged brain activity, in contrasts 
of baseline and experimental images. Thus meta-
bolic activity is statistically subtracted, yielding an 
image of relative activation differences.
All these statistical operations are subsumed by 
what is commonly known as the General Linear 
Model, a statistical model that includes regression 
and related methods such as analysis of variance. 
These methods form the basis of statistical para-
metric mapping, for example (for example, Friston, 
Holmes, Worsley, Poline, Frith, and Frackowiak 
1994; Friston et al. 2007). The approach is widely 
used and cited in the neuroimaging literature (for 
example, Mumford and Nichols 2009). The stan-
dard regression model states that an observable 
equals a weighted sum of predictors, plus error. 
Relying on these techniques in imaging analyses 
is logically equivalent to adopting a general lin-
ear model of the brain. As our commenters write, 
neuro scientists do not use the phrase “general lin-
ear model of the brain,” because they do not view it 
as an accurate description of how the brain works. 
Knowingly or not, neuroimagers using the sub-
tractive logic assume, as van Rooij and Van Orden 
wrote in the original article, “that the brain can be 
treated as the sum of its parts.”
According to Roskies’s (2010) defense of subtrac-
tion techniques, they rely on three crucial, a priori 
(before the fact), assumptions: 1) “brain instan-
tiates mind,” 2) “different localized regions of 
tissue have different and stable functionalities,” and 
3) “blood fl ow is a guide to neural activity.” Each of 
these assumptions is questionable.
Regarding assumption 1, debate on the nature 
of mind-body relations is a historically persistent 
and unsettled topic in biology, psychology, and 
metaphysics.
Assumption 2 that “different localized regions 
of tissue have different and stable functionalities” 
is best described as a working research hypoth-
esis: If the brain is composed of distinct, modular, 
functional regions that are causally transparent to 
thought and behavior, then differences in spatial 
brain activation can be functionally interpreted. 
The potential diffi culties with this approach have 
long been recognized, and remain conspicuously 
unanswered by advocates of subtraction such as 
Camerer, Smith, and their co-signers.
Our concern is that much of the neuroimaging 
enterprise is recapitulating previously established 
localizationist failures in behavioral methods. In 
1896, F. C. Donders, a Dutch ophthalmologist, 
developed the hypothesis of distinct component 
sub-operations intervening between a stimulus and 
response, and devised the subtractive method to 
investigate these components. The limitation of 
Donders’s method, which persists to this day, is that 
the hypothesized distinct components and subtasks 
must be known before the fact for the resulting 
subtractions to be meaningful (Uttal 2001). For 
instance, lesions to certain parts of the brain, and 
how they may affect specifi c behaviors, were among 
the earliest localizationist targets in behavioral 
studies (for example, Broca 1861). Nevertheless, 
the storied history of language-based dissociation 
studies has failed to converge on a view of the brain 
as including fi xed modules or even on criteria 
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for determining if such modules are an accurate 
description of how the brain works (Van Orden, 
Pennington, and Stone 2001).
The subtraction approach to studying local-
ization of brain activity depends crucially and 
circularly on both theory and task. As the comment 
from Camerer and Smith illustrates, the theoreti-
cal debates inevitably degenerate into irresolvable 
disputes about what aspects of task and method are 
displayed in a specifi c hypothetical brain function 
(Van Orden, Pennington, and Stone 2001). Given 
a vast and variegated set of potential brain studies 
from which to choose, and the fact that minor task 
details routinely yield contradictory theoretical nar-
ratives, it is unsurprising that they or we or anyone 
else could reach endlessly contradictory conclu-
sions regarding the same basic human activity, such 
as gambling.
Camerer, Smith, and their co-signers discuss how 
cross-method studies seek to resolve such issues. 
In practice, cross-method studies only amplify the 
already vast pool of potential contrasts, priorities, 
and perspectives on measured variables. They also 
claim that meta-analysis provides a solution, but 
meta-analysis is rooted in the self-same linear sta-
tistical system: “[T]he null hypothesis is that the 
n peak coordinates reported in the set of studies to 
be analyzed are randomly and uniformly distributed 
throughout gray matter” (Wager, Lindquist, and 
Kaplan 2007, p. 153, italics added).
By the mid-twentieth century, Saul Sternberg 
(1969) proposed an alternative method to dis-
cover subtask components in behavioral data that 
relieved the requirement that scientists know, 
before the fact, the functional components that 
intervene between a presented stimulus and par-
ticipant’s response. Sternberg proposed an additive 
factors logic. Broadly speaking, this approach used 
factorial manipulations to examine how compo-
nents might combine their effects additively.
Sternberg’s approach was potentially tracta-
ble, and within a few decades, an enormous set 
of psychological factors were assessed in multi-
factor behavioral experiments. Regarding the 
localizationist enterprise, to date, “not one cogni-
tive mechanism exists on which cognitive scientists 
can agree about its boundaries, its empirical shape, 
or details about its function” (Van Orden, Holden, 
and Turvey 2005, p. 121). Instead, complex, con-
textually embedded chains of interactions among 
factors are routinely observed across studies 
(Van Orden, Pennington, and Stone 2001). This 
outcome is expected in the absence of modularity.
Indeed, Camerer, Smith, and their co-signers 
implicitly arrive at the same conclusion when they 
refer to the localization of “multiple regions” and 
“brain networks.” The imaging literature now reports 
increasingly complex and distributed brain net-
works, measured during both tasked and untasked 
conditions (for example, Bullmore and Sporns 
2009; Ciuciu, Varoquaux, Abry, Sadaghiani, and 
Kleinschmidt 2012). Multiple motifs, or repeating 
connectivity patterns, are nested within a network’s 
connectivity. Different architectures that combine 
these low-level motifs provide for distinct local 
network fl ow patterns. The emerging emphasis is 
functional connectivity; the study of such patterns 
is sometimes called “connectomics,” by analogy to 
genomics. In stark contrast to subtracted images that 
identify just a few functional locations, the network 
approach reveals so many interconnected regions, 
scientists must wonder what regions are not function-
ally associated with a targeted activity (for example, 
Anderson 2010).
Assumption 3, that “blood fl ow is a guide to 
neural activity,” means that neuroimagers typically 
highlight those brain regions where the relative 
difference in blood fl ow between baseline and 
experimental sessions are at or near maximum. But 
what is special about a brain region that displays the 
largest differences in nutrient consumption?
Instead of considering blood fl ow measures in 
a brain, consider for a moment traffi c fl ow mea-
sures in a city. Imagine that a researcher has data 
available on vehicles operating with the highest 
fuel consumption at any given time (that is, maxi-
mum nutrient consumption), or vehicles with full 
gas tanks (that is, maximum Hb to dHb ratios). It 
would clearly be misguided to conclude that only 
these vehicles are participating in transportation 
activities. In reality, the overwhelming bulk of trans-
portation activities in a crowded city corresponds to 
vehicles that are not at extremes of fuel use or fuel 
storage—even stopped vehicles, at intersections for 
instance, crucially support transportation. It seems 
similarly unwise to assume that the brain areas with 
high nutrient consumption or BOLD signals are 
the only parts of the brain involved in a specifi c act 
of thinking.
As stated, fMRI statistical practices are rooted 
in the General Linear Model. Linear statistical 
methods are designed to discover and distinguish 
separable sets of constants (or means) shrouded 
by unsystematic, independent, and homogeneous 
sources of noise. As the fractal physiology literature 
cited by van Rooij and Van Orden makes clear, 
physiological signals rarely conform to such static 
assumptions. Instead, strong autocorrelation and 
inherent (fractal) fl uctuations are fundamental 
properties of nearly all physiological signals. Long 
ago, it was recognized that applying static linear 
statistical methods to measurements that express 
intrinsic, long-range fl uctuations, such as cardio-
vascular diffusion and fl ow, can be counted on to 
routinely yield spurious differences (as an example, 
see the Yule-Slutsky effect discussed in Klein, 1997).
The patterns we are discussing are also referred 
to as “scale-free.” In a model of the brain using 
subtractive logic, in which different tasks are associ-
ated with specifi c locations in the brain, the brain is 
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divided into modules that can be labeled as either 
contiguous or isolated based on their distance from 
each other. In a scale-free system, there is no “typi-
cal” distance or time scale, in the sense that any 
chosen size of scale leads to different conclusions 
about which modules are involved and intercon-
nected. Scale-free behavior is routinely reported 
in neuronal, fMRI BOLD, EEG, and behavioral sig-
nals. On this point, imaging and behavioral studies 
are in an unusual position of agreement regarding 
the empirical facts. Ubiquitous scale-free patterns 
in physiology and behavior implicate underlying 
fl exible, self-organizing, and dynamic pattern for-
mation processes, as discussed by van Rooij and 
Van Orden.
This exquisite dynamic fl exibility has crucial 
implications. The instantaneous neurophysiologic 
details of every human thought or act may be suf-
fi ciently idiosyncratic that neuroimages reveal 
largely transient patterns. If so, then imaging prac-
tices that seek to determine a specifi c location in 
the brain associated with a specifi c cognitive func-
tion, are analogous to attempting to infer a theory 
of lightning by tracing the paths of reams of individ-
ual lightning bolt images. As Uttal (2001) famously 
claimed, subtractive brain imaging is effectively a 
new phrenology.
Marieke van Rooij
John G. Holden
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio
*Note: Guy Van Orden passed away May 11th, 2012. 
Thus, John G. Holden, one of Guy’s long-time col-
laborators, served as co-author on this response.
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